matter of the Danish duchies.  It would have insisted on the fulfilment of the arrangement that was made years before, in which case it would have been supported by the whole power of France and England, and not improbably by that of Russia; and against so great an array of force, Prussia, even if backed by the opinion of Germany, never would have thought of contending,—­and some of the German governments would have sided with the allies, and would have behaved much more efficiently than they did in the late war.  Prussia would have been isolated, as France was in 1840; and that party which was opposed to Bismarck’s policy would have obtained control of her councils, the effect of which would have been to preserve peace, the very thing that was most necessary to Austria’s welfare.  Instead of opposing Prussia, Austria joined her, and insisted on having a part in the very business that offended the Germans as much as it disgusted foreigners.  Thus a state of things was brought about which made a German war inevitable, while Austria was deprived of all aid from abroad.  England’s sympathies were with Austria, as against Prussia; and yet England had been shabbily treated by Austria in respect to the duchies, and it was impossible for her either to forget or forgive such treatment.  France had less cause to be offended; but Napoleon III. could not have approved of action which seemed to be taken in disregard of his high position in Europe, and was calculated to advance the ends of Prussia,—­the power least respected by the French,—­and which finally made of that power the destroyer of the settlement of 1815,[32] a part the Emperor had intended for himself.  Having acted thus unwisely, and having no support from Russia, Austria should have avoided war in 1866, at any cost; and it was in her power to avoid it down to the time that she made the German Diet so proceed as to furnish Prussia with an excellent reason for setting her well-prepared armies in motion against the ill-prepared forces of her foe.  Noting the folly of Austria, and observing that the French government, if M. de Lavalette’s circular can be depended upon as an expression of its sentiments, is all for peace, we can see no opening for that renewal of warfare in Europe which the defeated party is said to desire, as an ally of France, in the expectation that she might recover the place she so lately lost.  The reopening of the Eastern Question, of which much is said, might afford some hope to Austria, but not to the extent that is supposed; for she is not strong enough at this time to be a powerful ally of Russia as against Turkey, or of England in support of Turkey.  She has parted with her old importance; for there is no further hiding from the world that her system is vicious, and that nothing could be gained from an alliance with her, while any country with which she should be associated would have to extend to her much support.  She may rise again, but how, or in what manner, it is not in any man’s power to say.