provided that one do so in a submissive and zealous spirit, with intent to sustain and exalt the glory of God.  And when we succeed in respect of his justice, we shall likewise be impressed by his greatness and charmed by his goodness, which will show themselves through the clouds of a seeming reason that is deceived by outward [120] appearances, in proportion as the mind is elevated by true reason to that which to us is invisible, but none the less sure.

82.  ‘Thus’ (to continue with M. Bayle) ’reason will be compelled to lay down its arms, and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith, which it can and ought to do, in virtue of some of its most incontestable maxims.  Thus also in renouncing some of its other maxims it acts nevertheless in accordance with that which it is, that is to say, in reason.’  But one must know ’that such maxims of reason as must be renounced in this case are only those which make us judge by appearances or according to the ordinary course of things.’  This reason enjoins upon us even in philosophical subjects, when there are invincible proofs to the contrary.  It is thus that, being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the justice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and injustice which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our gaze.  Hitherto we have been illumined by the light of Nature and by that of grace, but not yet by that of glory.  Here on earth we see apparent injustice, and we believe and even know the truth of the hidden justice of God; but we shall see that justice when at last the Sun of Justice shall show himself as he is.

83.  It is certain that M. Bayle can only be understood as meaning those ostensible maxims which must give way before the eternal verities; for he acknowledges that reason is not in reality contrary to faith.  In these posthumous Dialogues he complains (p. 73, against M. Jacquelot) of being accused of the belief that our Mysteries are in reality against reason, and (p. 9, against M. le Clerc) of the assertion made that he who acknowledges that a doctrine is exposed to irrefutable objections acknowledges also by a necessary consequence the falsity of this doctrine.  Nevertheless one would be justified in the assertion if the irrefutability were more than an outward appearance.

84.  It may be, therefore, that having long contended thus against M. Bayle on the matter of the use of reason I shall find after all that his opinions were not fundamentally so remote from mine as his expressions, which have provided matter for our considerations, have led one to believe.  It is true that frequently he appears to deny absolutely that one can ever answer the objections of reason against faith, and that he asserts the necessity of comprehending, in order to achieve such an end, how the Mystery comes [121] to be or exists.  Yet there are passages where he becomes milder, and contents himself with saying that