incline the will without necessitating it.  For this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a necessitation.  It is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will follow this inclination; but this effect does not follow thence by a consequence which is necessary, that is, whose contrary implies contradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the will is determined, without the presence of necessity.  Suppose that one has the greatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will admit that the soul can find some reason for resisting it, even if it were only that of displaying its power.  Thus though one may never have complete indifference of equipoise, and there is always a predominance of inclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not render absolutely necessary the resolution taken.

OBJECTION IV

Whoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so, but rather contributes to it, although he be fully apprised of it, is accessary thereto.

God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures; but he does not so, and he rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the opportunities he causes, although he is fully cognizant of it.

Therefore, etc.

ANSWER

I deny the major of this syllogism.  It may be that one can prevent the sin, but that one ought not to do so, because one could not do so without committing a sin oneself, or (when God is concerned) without acting unreasonably.  I have given instances of that, and have applied them to[383] God himself.  It may be also that one contributes to the evil, and that one even opens the way to it sometimes, in doing things one is bound to do.  And when one does one’s duty, or (speaking of God) when, after full consideration, one does that which reason demands, one is not responsible for events, even when one foresees them.  One does not will these evils; but one is willing to permit them for a greater good, which one cannot in reason help preferring to other considerations.  This is a consequent will, resulting from acts of antecedent will, in which one wills the good.  I know that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent and consequent will of God, have meant by the antecedent that which wills that all men be saved, and by the consequent that which wills, in consequence of persistent sin, that there be some damned, damnation being a result of sin.  But these are only examples of a more general notion, and one may say with the same reason, that God wills by his antecedent will that men sin not, and that by his consequent or final and decretory will (which is always followed by its effect) he wills to permit that they sin, this permission being a result of superior reasons.  One has indeed justification for saying, in general, that the antecedent will of God tends towards the production of good and the prevention