357.  It is true that the same thing may be represented in different ways; but there must always be an exact relation between the representation and the thing, and consequently between the different representations of one and the same thing.  The projections in perspective of the conic sections of the circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by an ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by another circle, a straight line and a point.  Nothing appears so different nor so dissimilar as these figures; and yet there is an exact relation between each point and every other point.  Thus one must allow that each soul represents the universe to itself according to its point of view, and through a relation which is peculiar to it; but a perfect harmony always subsists therein.  God, if he wished to effect representation of the dissolution of continuity of [340] the body by an agreeable sensation in the soul, would not have neglected to ensure that this very dissolution should serve some perfection in the body, by giving it some new relief, as when one is freed of some burden or loosed from some bond.  But organic bodies of such kinds, although possible, do not exist upon our globe, which doubtless lacks innumerable inventions that God may have put to use elsewhere.  Nevertheless it is enough that, due allowance being made for the place our world holds in the universe, nothing can be done for it better than what God does.  He makes the best possible use of the laws of nature which he has established and (as M. Regis also acknowledged in the same passage) ’the laws that God has established in nature are the most excellent it is possible to conceive’.

358.  I will add to that the remark from the Journal des Savants of the 16th March 1705, which M. Bayle has inserted in chapter 162 of the Reply to the Questions of a Provincial (vol.  III, p. 1030).  The matter in question is the extract from a very ingenious modern book on the Origin of Evil, to which I have already referred here.  It is stated:  ’that the general solution in respect of physical evil which this book gives is that the universe must be regarded as a work composed of various pieces which form a whole; that, according to the laws established in nature, some parts cannot be better unless others become worse, whence would result a system less perfect as a whole.  This principle’, the writer goes on, ’is good; but if nothing is added to it, it does not appear sufficient.  Why has God established laws that give rise to so many difficulties? philosophers who are somewhat precise will say.  Could he not have established others of a kind not subject to any defects?  And to cut the matter short, how comes it that he has prescribed laws for himself?  Why does he not act without general laws, in accordance with all his power and all his goodness?  The writer has not carried the difficulty as far as that.  By disentangling his ideas one might indeed possibly find means of solving the difficulty, but there is no development of the subject in his work.’