103.  But were one to admit even here this use of mediate knowledge against all appearances, this knowledge still implies that God considers what a man would do in such and such circumstances; and it always remains true that God could have placed him in other circumstances more favourable, and given him inward or outward succour capable of vanquishing the most abysmal wickedness existing in any soul.  I shall be told that God is not bound to do so, but that is not enough; it must be added that greater reasons prevent him from making all his goodness felt by all.  Thus there must [180] needs be choice; but I do not think one must seek the reason altogether in the good or bad nature of men.  For if with some people one assume that God, choosing the plan which produces the most good, but which involves sin and damnation, has been prompted by his wisdom to choose the best natures in order to make them objects of his grace, this grace would not sufficiently appear to be a free gift.  Accordingly man will be distinguishable by a kind of inborn merit, and this assumption seems remote from the principles of St. Paul, and even from those of Supreme Reason.

104.  It is true that there are reasons for God’s choice, and the consideration of the object, that is, the nature of man, must needs enter therein; but it does not seem that this choice can be subjected to a rule such as we are capable of conceiving, and such as may flatter the pride of men.  Some famous theologians believe that God offers more grace, and in a more favourable way, to those whose resistance he foresees will be less, and that he abandons the rest to their self-will.  We may readily suppose that this is often the case, and this expedient, among those which make man distinguishable by anything favourable in his nature, is the farthest removed from Pelagianism.  But I would not venture, notwithstanding, to make of it a universal rule.  Moreover, that we may not have cause to vaunt ourselves, it is necessary that we be ignorant of the reasons for God’s choice.  Those reasons are too diverse to become known to us; and it may be that God at times shows the power of his grace by overcoming the most obstinate resistance, to the end that none may have cause either to despair or to be puffed up.  St. Paul, as it would seem, had this in mind when he offered himself as an example.  God, he said, has had mercy upon me, to give a great example of his patience.

105.  It may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad, and consequently incapable of being distinguished the one from the other through their good or less bad natural qualities; but they are not bad all in the same way:  for there is an inherent individual difference between souls, as the Pre-established Harmony proves.  Some are more or less inclined towards a particular good or a particular evil, or towards their opposites, all in accordance with their natural dispositions.  But since the general plan of the universe, chosen by God for superior reasons, causes