The mutual civilities between the Spanish and British officers, while in expectation of peace, were certainly to the honour of both parties.  It seems, however, to have been soon suspected, that advantage was taken of a most humane indulgence.

On the 30th of June, a letter was addressed, by Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson, to Don Josef Mazerendo, the Spanish admiral, from on board the Theseus, which evidently intimated apprehensions of such an effect.

     “SIR,

“I am directed by my worthy commander in chief to inform your excellency, that numbers of the Spanish fishing-boats are found at such a distance from the land as plainly to evince that they have something farther in view than catching fish; and, therefore, that orders are given, that no fishing vessel be in future permitted to go farther from the shore than their usual fishing ground; which, we understand, is in about thirty-five fathoms water.  Your excellency, I am confident, will receive this communication as an additional mark of attention from my commander in chief to the inhabitants of Cadiz and it’s environs; and will take measures for the information of the fishermen that their boats will be sunk, if found acting in contradiction to this notification of the British admiral.  With every sincere good wish towards your excellency, believe me, your most obedient,

     “Horatio Nelson.”

This seems the prelude of augmented precaution, and a more rigid adherence to the closeness of the blockade.  It was usual to send, nightly, a guard of one or two boats, manned and armed, from each ship, into the very mouth of the harbour.  These were supported by some gun-boats, purposely fitted for the occasion; and which, in case of attack, depended for their own protection on the interior line of ships under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson.  With a view to enforce a strict attention throughout all the inferior branches of the service, the rear-admiral was accustomed to be rowed, in his barge, through these guard-boats, after they had been duly stationed for the night.  Thus officers and men were kept constantly in a state of alertness; and ready to repel any attack which might be meditated against them from the blockaded port itself.  The Spaniards, too, had equipped a number of gun-boats and large launches, in which they also rowed guard during the night, to prevent any nearer approach of the blockaders; who might, otherwise, they feared, suddenly annoy their fleet.  On these occasions, they sometimes approached each other; and several little skirmishes had occurred, but none of any importance.

As the Spaniards seemed to be perpetually increasing the number of these gun-boats and armed launches, the British commander in chief thought it necessary to give them a timely check.  So that, notwithstanding the occasional civilities of their epistolary correspondence, such are often the necessary deceptions of war, that hostilities were, perhaps, all the time, meditating by both parties.  Certain it is, that on the night of the 3d of July, only three days after the date of the above letter, Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson received orders actually to bombard Cadiz, without any polite intimation to the ladies of that city of the real danger which now awaited them.