your part, in giving me so fine a fleet; and I hope to do mine, in making use of them.  It is my intention to get into the mouth of the Archipelago; where, if the enemy are gone towards Constantinople, we shall hear of them directly:  if I get no information there, to go to Cyprus; where, if they are in Syria or Egypt, I must hear of them.  We have a report that, on the 1st of July, the French were seen off Candia; but, near what part of the island I cannot learn.”

Being now ready for sea, and finding that the French fleet had neither been seen in the Archipelago, nor the Adriatic, nor gone down the Mediterranean, he concluded that the coast of Egypt must still be the object of their destination.  With this impression on his anxious mind, it is not to be supposed that he would for a moment hesitate in again seeking them there, through any consideration of the immoderate heat of climate, or other experienced or apprehended hardships.

On the 25th of July, accordingly, the British squadron sailed from Syracuse; and, hoping some positive information might be obtained in the Morea, he steered first for that coast:  having, on the 28th, made the Gulph of Coron, Captain Troubridge was dispatched with the Culloden, into the port of Coron; off which place, owing to the usual active exertion of that able officer, the fleet was not detained longer than three hours.  The Turkish governor, with great pleasure, gave Captain Troubridge the welcome intelligence, that the enemy had been seen steering to the south-east, from Candia, about four weeks before.  The captain had, also, during his very short visit, the satisfaction of observing that the inhabitants of Coron entertained the most serious apprehensions from the French armament, and expressed the greatest possible detestation and abhorrence of that people.

The reasons now became evident, which had before seemed unaccountable, how it happened that the enemy should have been missed by the British squadron, both in it’s passage to Alexandria, and in it’s return to Syracuse.  The French, having steered a direct course for Candia, had necessarily made an angular passage towards Alexandria; while Admiral Nelson, by immediately proceeding to Alexandria, most materially shortened the distance.  The smallness of his squadron, too, making it expedient to sail in close order, the space which it occupied was extremely limited; and, having no frigates to detach on the look out, the chance of descrying the enemy, unless very near, amid the haze of the atmosphere in that climate, was prodigiously circumscribed.  Under these circumstances, the distance of about thirty-five leagues, between Candia and the Barbary coast, must be considered as leaving more than sufficient space for two of the largest fleets ever known mutually to pass without the smallest observation of one another.  In returning to Syracuse, the British squadron, by steering up to the northward, while the enemy kept a southern coast for Alexandria, had the chance of falling in with them rendered still less likely than before.