To affirm that every man has this “Absolute Religion” without external revelation is much as if a man were to say that we have an “Absolute Philosophy” on the same terms, in virtue of man’s having faculties which prompt him to philosophize in some way.  All religions contain the Absolute Religion, says Mr. Parker:  Just, I reply, as all philosophies contain the absolute philosophy.  The philosophy of Plato, of Aristotle of Bacon, of Locke, of Leibnitz, of Reid, are all philosophies, no doubt; but that is all that is to be said.  Even contraries must resemble one another in one point, or they could not be contrasted.  In truth, there is, I think, a striking analogy between man’s spiritual and intellectual condition; only his intellect is a little less variable than his “spiritual faculty”; far more so, however, than his senses.  His animal nature is more defined than his intellectual, his intellectual than his spiritual and moral.  All the phenomena point either to an imperfect organization of his nobler faculties, or to the doctrine of the “Fall.”

But further, surely if this internal oracle exists in man, every sincere and earnest soul, on interrogating his consciousness, would hear the indubitable response,—­would enjoy the beatific vision of “spiritual insight.”  If this be asserted, I for one have to say to this representation, that, so far as my own consciousness informs me, I have honestly, sincerely, and with utmost diligence, interrogated my spirit; and I solemnly protest, that, apart from those external influences and that external instruction which the revelation from within is supposed to anticipate and supersede, I am not conscious that I should have any of the sentiments which either of these writers make the sum of religion.  Even as to that fundamental position,—­the existence of a Being of unlimited power and wisdom, (as to his unlimited goodness, I believe nothing but an external revelation can absolutely certify us,) I feel that I am much more indebted to those influences from design, which these writers made so light of, than to any clearness in the imperfect intuition:  for if I found—­and surely this is the true test—­the traces of design less conspicuous in the external world, confusion there, as in the moral and in both greater than is now found in either; I extremely doubt whether the faintest surmise of such a Being would have suggested itself to me.  But be that as it may; as to their other cardinal sentiments,—­the nature of my relations to this Being,—­his placability; if offended, —­the terms of forgiveness, if any,—­whether, as these gentlemen affirm, he is accessible to all, without any atonement or mediator;—­as to all this, I solemnly declare, that, apart from external instruction; I cannot by interrogating my racked spirit, catch even a murmur.  That it must be faint, indeed, in other men, so faint as to render the pretensions of the certitude of the internal revelation, and its independence of all external revelation, perfectly preposterous,