“I am not talking—­I am not thinking—­as to whether it would matter or not.  I merely remark that, in relation to the generality of people, at all events, they cannot obtain certainty on any remote historical questions.  Of course, with regard to ordinary history, it is neither a man’s duty, strictly speaking, to believe or disbelieve; and therefore I said nothing about duty.  But in neither the one case nor the other is it possible for the bulk of mankind to obtain satisfaction, from a personal investigation, as to the facts of remote history, or indeed any history at all, except of a man’s own life and that perhaps of his own family, up to his father and down to his son!  What do you say to this,—­yes or no?”

“I do not know that I should object to say that the great bulk of mankind never can obtain a sufficiently certain knowledge of any fact of history to warrant their belief of it.”

“Very consistent, I think; for you doubtless perceive that if we say they can obtain a reasonable ground of assurance of the facts of remote history,—­so that, if any thing did or does depend on their believing it, they are truly in possession of a warrant for acting on that belief,—­I say you then see whither our argument, Mr. Newman’s and yours and mine, is going; it vanishes,—­oichetai, as Socrates would say.  If, for example, men can attain reasonable certainty in relation to Alfred and Cromwell, alas! they may do the like in reference to Christ; and many persons will say much more easily.  Now, with my too habitual scepticism, I confess to a feeling of difficulty here.  You know there are thousands and tens of thousands amongst us, who, if you asked respecting the history of Alfred the Great or Oliver Cromwell, would glibly repeat to you all the principal facts of the story,—­as they suppose; and if you ask them whether they have ever investigated critically the sources whence they had obtained their knowledge, they will say, No; but that they have read the things in Hume’s History; or, perhaps, (save the mark!) in Goldsmith’s Abridgment!  But they are profoundly ignorant of even the names of the principal authorities, and have never investigated one of the many doubtful points which have perplexed historians; nay, as to most of them, are not even aware that they exist.  Yet nothing can be more certain, than that their supposed knowledge would embrace by far the most important conclusions at which the most accurate historians have arrived.  It would be principally in a supposed juster comprehension of minor points—­of details—­that the latter would have an advantage over them; compensated, however, by a ‘plentiful assortment’ of doubts on other points, from which these simple souls are free; doubts which are the direct result of more extensive investigation, but which can scarcely be thought additions to our knowledge;—­they are rather additions to our ignorance.  The impressions of the mass of readers on all the main facts of the two memorable periods respectively would be the same