be established by the principal.  It breaks in upon the esprit de corps, so apt to prevail in permanent bodies; it gives a chance for the public eye penetrating into the sanctuary of those proceedings and practices, which the avarice of the directors may introduce for their personal emolument, and which the resentments of excluded directors, or the honesty of those duly admitted, might betray to the public; and it gives an opportunity at the end of the year, or at other periods, of correcting a choice, which, on trial, proves to have been unfortunate; an evil of which themselves complain in their distant institutions.  Whether, however, they have a power to alter this or not, the executive has no right to decide; and their consultation with you has been merely an act of complaisance, or from a desire to shield so important an innovation under the cover of executive sanction.  But ought we to volunteer our sanction in such a case?  Ought we to disarm ourselves of any fair right of animadversion, whenever that institution shall be a legitimate subject of consideration?  I own I think the most proper answer would be, that we do not think ourselves authorized to give an opinion on the question.

From a passage in the letter of the President, I observe an idea of establishing a branch bank of the United States in New Orleans.  This institution is one of the most deadly hostility existing, against the principles and form of our constitution.  The nation is, at this time, so strong and united in its sentiments, that it cannot be shaken at this moment.  But suppose a series of untoward events should occur, sufficient to bring into doubt the competency of a republican government to meet a crisis of great danger, or to unhinge the confidence of the people in the public functionaries; an institution like this, penetrating by its branches every part of the Union, acting by command and in phalanx, may, in a critical moment, upset the government.  I deem no government safe which is under the vassalage of any self-constituted authorities, or any other authority than that of the nation, or its regular functionaries.  What an obstruction could not this bank of the United States, with all its branch banks, be in time of war?  It might dictate to us the peace we should accept, or withdraw its aids.  Ought we then to give further growth to an institution so powerful, so hostile?  That it is so hostile we know, 1. from a knowledge of the principles of the persons composing the body of directors in every bank, principal or branch; and those of most of the stock-holders:  2. from their opposition to the measures and principles of the government, and to the election of those friendly to them:  and, 3. from the sentiments of the newspapers they support.  Now, while we are strong, it is the greatest duty we owe to the safety of our constitution, to bring this powerful enemy to a perfect subordination under its authorities.  The first measure would be to reduce them to an equal footing only with other