The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 465 pages of information about The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915.

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 465 pages of information about The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915.

It is quite certain that the breach of the Belgian neutrality by Germany was used in Great Britain as a powerful instrument to influence the public sentiment.  Every war must be borne by national unity, and it is the duty of the nation’s leaders to secure such unity by all practicable means.  But has it been forgotten that the attitude of Sir Edward Grey caused such excellent men as Lord Morley, John Burns, and Sir John Trevelyan to leave the Cabinet, where they were looked upon as the best and most liberal members of the ruling combination?  Bernard Shaw says of Great Britain that she has never been at a loss for an effective moral attitude.  Such an attitude is a powerful weapon in diplomatical and actual warfare, and it must be resorted to, if the necessity arises.  But that cannot blind us to the fact that the British Government allowed the political interest to be the paramount consideration in this Belgian neutrality matter.  The German interest for not acting on the guarantee was just as strong as the English to act for it.

The proof is found in the English “White Paper.”  I cite the famous reprint of THE TIMES, (Dispatch No. 148 of Aug. 2 to Paris.) Here Sir Edward Grey says:  “We were considering ... whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli.”

“Treaties Must Not Be Overrated.”

I am an ardent believer in all international arrangements to prevent difficulties and wars between nations, and I rejoice with the American people in the signal success this policy is now having in this country.  But international treaties must not be overrated.  There are questions which cannot be settled by them.  It is too difficult to explain just the nature of such situations as arose in Europe, so I may be permitted for once to ask this question:  Does Prof.  Eliot believe that the majority of the American people think that the unwritten Monroe Doctrine could be made the subject of arbitration, whether it had a right to exist or to be enforced?  I must emphatically say, No, it could not.  It can be as little arbitrated upon as a matter of religion or of personal morals.

Mr. Eliot thinks a happy result of the war would be that American institutions should prevail in Germany thereafter.  Why should Germany only become a representative republic?  Does he not demand the same regarding Russia, England, Italy, Austria, and Japan?  And if not, why not?

From all this I fail to see the point in the reasons given by Prof.  Eliot why fair-minded Americans should side with the Allies because the objections made against German procedure, down to the breach of the Belgian neutrality, must be made against all other European States.  British history is just teeming with examples of broken treaties and torn “scraps of paper.”  The chasing of German diplomatic representatives out of neutral Egypt is a case in point.

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The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.