it was not till then that Spragge received his promotion.  Both Monck and Rupert must therefore receive the credit of foreseeing the danger that lay in the new system, the danger of tactical pedantry that was destined to hamper the action of our fleets for the next half century, and of being the first to declare, long before Anson or Hawke, and longer still before Nelson, that line or no line, signals or no signals, ’the destruction of the enemy is always to be made the chiefest care.’

In the light of this discovery we can at last explain the curious conversation recorded by Pepys, which, wrongly interpreted, has done so much to distort the early history of tactics.  The circumstances of Monck’s great action must first be recalled.  At the end of May, he and Rupert, with a fleet of about eighty sail, had put to sea to seek the Dutch, when a sudden order reached them from the court that the French Mediterranean fleet was coming up channel to join hands with the enemy, and that Rupert with his squadron of twenty sail was to go westward to stop it.  The result of this foolish order was that on June 1 Monck found himself in presence of the whole Dutch fleet of nearly a hundred sail, with no more than fifty-nine of his own.[7] Seeing an advantage, however, he attacked them furiously, throwing his whole weight upon their van.  Though at first successful shoals forced him to tack, and his rear fell foul of the Dutch centre and rear, so that he came off severely handled.  The next day he renewed the fight with forty-four sail against about eighty, and with so much skill that he was able that night to make an orderly retreat, covering his disabled ships with those least injured ’in a line abreadth.’[8] On the 3rd the retreat was continued.  So well was it managed that the Dutch could not touch him, and towards evening he was able near the Galloper Sand to form a junction with Rupert, who had been recalled.  Together on the 4th day they returned to the fight with as fierce a determination as ever.  Though to leeward, they succeeded in breaking through the enemy’s line, such as it was.  Being in too great an inferiority of numbers, however, they could not reap the advantage of their manoeuvre.[9] It only resulted in their being doubled on, and the two fleets were soon mingled in a raging mass without order or control; and when in the end they parted after a four days’ fight, without example for endurance and carnage in naval history, the English had suffered a reverse at least as great as that they had inflicted on the Dutch in the last year’s action.

Such a terrific object lesson could not be without its effects on the great tactical question.  But let us see how it looked in the eyes of a French eye-witness, who was naturally inclined to a favourable view of his Dutch allies.  Of the second day’s fight he says:  ’Sur les six heures du matin nous appercumes la flotte des Anglais qui revenoit dans une ordre admirable.  Car ils marchent par le front