Such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as enunciated in its opening paragraphs.  He then proceeds to elaborate it in two detailed plans of attack—­one from to-leeward and the other from to-windward.  It was the latter he meant to make if possible.  He calls it ‘the intended attack,’ and it accords with the opening enunciation.  The organisation is triple, but no special function is assigned to the reserve squadron.  The actual attack on the enemy’s rear is to be made by Collingwood, while Nelson with his own division and the reserve is to cover him.  In the event of an attack having to be made from to-leeward, the idea is different.  Here the containing movement practically disappears.  The fleet is still to attack the rear and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the severed line.  To none of the divisions is assigned the duty of containing the rest of the enemy’s fleet from the outset.  It is to be dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage.  ’The whole impression,’ as Nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy’s line from a little ahead of the centre to the rearmost ship.  He does not say, however, that this was to be ‘the whole impression’ of the intended attack from to-windward.  ‘The whole impression’ there appears to be for Collingwood to overpower the rear while Nelson with the other two divisions made play with the enemy’s van and centre; but the particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design is left undetermined.

The important point, then, in considering the relation between the actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward.  The somewhat illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly important distinction.  For Nelson interpolates between his explanation of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not apply.  That some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves.

After the battle Captain Harvey, of the Temeraire, whom Nelson had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, ’It was noon before the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions given us by Lord Nelson....  Lord Nelson had given me leave to lead and break through the line about the fourteenth ship,’ i.e. two or three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for the leeward attack but not for the windward.