The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the genesis and history of his memorandum.  As early as 1798, when he was hoping to intercept Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet commander.  It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the lesson of St. Vincent:  ’As it is very probable the enemy will not be formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate divisions.  In which case the commanders of divisions are strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order, and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their ships.’[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own division of six sail and two others of four each.  ’Had he fallen in with the French fleet at sea,’ wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home with despatches after the Nile, ’that he might make the best impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each].  Two of these sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it could.’[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his captains, but no further record of his design has been found.  Still there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same time that gives us the needed light.  We cannot fail to notice the striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been broken up by the fireships.  That attack was made intuitively by divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and Nelson’s new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which he too intended.  The alteration he ordered was to change the signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own division and make any signals he thought proper.

But this was not all.  By the same general order he made two other alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in order of battle.  They too are of the highest interest and run as follows:  ’To be inserted in pencil in the signal book.  At No. 182.  Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack the enemy’s line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy’s line.’  No. 183.  ’I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy’s rear.’[10]