The king, on his part, began to concert measures with his Privy Council for the subjugation of Scotland. The “Committee on Scotch affairs” of the English Privy Council was obviously unconstitutional, but matters were fast drifting towards civil war, and it was no time to consider constitutional niceties. It is much more important that the committee was divided and useless. Wentworth, writing from Ireland, advised the king to maintain a firm attitude, but not to provoke an outbreak of war at so inconvenient a moment. Charles again attempted a compromise. He offered to withdraw Laud’s unlucky service-book, the new canons, and even the Articles of Perth, and to limit the power of the bishops; and he asked the people to sign the Covenant of 1580-81, on which the new Covenant was based, but which, of course, contained no reference to immediate difficulties. But it was too late; the sentiment of religious independence had become united to the old feeling of national independence, and war was inevitable. The Scots were fortunate in their leaders. In the end of 1638 there returned to Scotland from Germany, Alexander Leslie, the great soldier who had fought for Protestantism under Gustavus Adolphus. In February, 1639, he took command of the army of the Covenant, which had been largely reinforced by veterans from the Thirty Years’ War. A more attractive personality than Leslie’s was that of the young Earl of Montrose, who had attached himself with enthusiasm to the national cause, and had attempted to convert the people of Aberdeen to covenanting principles. Charles, on his part, asserted that his throne was in danger, and that the Scottish preparations constituted a menace to the kingdom of England, and so attempted to rouse enthusiasm for himself.