and rendered more securely despotic:—­“But this is entirely lost sight of by the people, who, even at the present day, imagine that the parliament is all-powerful, and the sovereign powerless.  But I must be allowed to say, that those ancient monarchs acted wisely, and the result of their policy has not been sufficiently perceived....  For when parliament was constituted, the power of retaining armed vassals and servants, which the barons had enjoyed for so long a period, was abolished, and has never been resumed even by princes of the blood; so that they could no longer resist the authority of the king, who alone had the privilege of raising and maintaining troops—­a right never conceded to parliament.  Besides this the powers of life and death, and of declaring war, were identified with the person of the sovereign; and with respect to the latter, it is never, until it has been decided upon, even intimated to the parliament, which possesses only the power of collecting the taxes, from which the expenses of the war the king may enter into must be paid.  The possession, therefore, of these two rights by the king, is equivalent to the tenure of absolute power.”  The possibility of the supplies being refused by a refractory House of Commons, seems either not to have occurred to the khan, or to have escaped his recollection at the moment of his penning this sentence; and though he subsequently alludes to the responsibility of ministers, he never seems to have comprehended the nature and extent of the control exercised by parliament over the finances of the nation, so fully as the Persian princes, who tell us, in their quaint phraseology, that “if the expenses that were made should be agreeable to the Commons, well and good—­if not, the vizirs must stand the consequences; and every person who has given ten tomans of the revenue, has a right to rise up in the House of Commons, and seize the vizir of the treasury by the collar, saying, ‘What have you done with my money?’”—­a mode of putting to the question which, if now and then practically adopted by some hard-fisted son of the soil, we have no doubt would operate as a most salutary check on the vagaries of Chancellors of the Exchequer.

It is strange that the Khan should not, in this case, perceive the fallacy of his own argument, or see that the power of the sword must always virtually rest with the holder of the purse; since immediately afterwards, after enlarging on the enormous amount of taxes levied in England, the oppressive nature of some of them, especially the window-tax, “for the light of heaven is God’s gift to mankind,” he proceeds—­“In other countries it would perhaps cost the king, who imposed such taxes, his head; but here the blame is laid on the House of Commons, without any one dreaming of censuring the sovereign, in whose name they are levied, and for whose use they are applied;” citing as a proof of this the ease with which the insurrection of Wat Tyler and his followers, against