behaved, not only so gallantly, but with such unusual initiative, in Byron’s engagement.  A singular incident in this case led him to a like independence of action, which displeased Rodney.  The Montagu, of his division, when closing the French line, wore against the helm, and could only be brought into action on the wrong (port) tack.  Immediately upon this, part of the French rear also wore, and Rowley followed them of his own motion.  Being called to account by Rodney, he stated the facts, justifying the act by the order that “the greatest impression was to be made on the enemy’s rear.”  Both parties soon wore back.

Hyde Parker went home in a rage a few weeks later.  The certificates to Bowyer and Douglas, certainly, and probably to Molloy, all of Parker’s division, bore the stinging words that these officers “meant well, and would have done their duty had they been permitted.”  It is stated that their ships, which were the rear of the van division, were going down to engage close, following Rodney’s example, when Parker made them a signal to keep the line.  If this be so, as Parker’s courage was beyond all doubt, it was simply a recurrence of the old superstition of the line, aggravated by a misunderstanding of Rodney’s later signals.  These must be discussed, for the whole incident is part of the history of the British Navy, far more important than many an indecisive though bloody encounter.

One of the captains more expressly blamed, Carkett of the Stirling Castle, which had been the leading ship at the time the signal to alter the course toward the enemy was made, wrote to Rodney that he understood that his name had been mentioned, unfavourably of course, in the public letter.  Rodney’s reply makes perfectly apparent the point at issue, his own plan, the ideas running in his head as he made his successive signals, the misconceptions of the juniors, and the consequent fiasco.  It must be said, however, that, granting the facts as they seem certainly to have occurred, no misunderstanding, no technical verbal allegation, can justify a military stupidity so great as that of which he complained.  There are occasions in which not only is literal disobedience permissible, but literal obedience, flying in the face of the evident conditions, becomes a crime.

At 8 in the morning, Rodney had made a general signal of his purpose to attack the enemy’s rear.  This, having been understood and answered, was hauled down; all juniors had been acquainted with a general purpose, to which the subsequent manoeuvres were to lead.  How he meant to carry out his intention was evidenced by the consecutive course of action while on that tack,—­the starboard; when the time came, the fleet bore up together, in line abreast, standing for the French rear.  This attempt, being balked then by de Guichen’s wearing, was renewed two hours later; only in place of the signal to form line abreast, was made one to alter the course