As soon as the coast was clear, d’Estaing, informed of Byron’s object, sent a small combined expedition against St. Vincent, which was surrendered on the 18th of the month.  On the 30th the French admiral himself quitted Fort Royal with his whole fleet,—­twenty-five ships of the line and several frigates,—­directing his course for the British Island of Grenada, before which he anchored on the 2d of July.  With commendable promptitude, he landed his troops that evening, and on the 4th the island capitulated.  Except as represented by one small armed sloop, which was taken, the British Navy had no part in this transaction.  Thirty richly laden merchant ships were captured in the port.

At daybreak of July 6th, Byron appeared with twenty-one sail of the line, one frigate, and a convoy of twenty-eight vessels, carrying troops and equipments.  He had returned to Santa Lucia on the 1st, and there had heard of the loss of St. Vincent, with a rumor that the French had gone against Grenada.  He consequently had put to sea on the 3d, with the force mentioned.

[Illustration]

The British approach was reported to d’Estaing during the night of July 5th.  Most of his fleet was then lying at anchor off Georgetown, at the south-west of the island; some vessels, which had been under way on look-out duty, had fallen to leeward.[57] At 4 A.M. the French began to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle on the starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as possible without regard to usual stations.  When daylight had fully made, the British fleet (A) was seen standing down from the northward, close inshore, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by east.  It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the ships nearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have been in the rear on the then tack.  For this condition there is no evident excuse; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowly that the war-ships can keep reasonable order for mutual support.  Moreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency, or when no enemy can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so when the imminent probability of a meeting exists.  The worst results of the day are to be attributed to this fault.  Being short of frigates, Byron had assigned three ships of the line (a), under Rear-Admiral Rowley, to the convoy, which of course was on the off hand from the enemy, and somewhat in the rear.  It was understood, however, that these would be called into the line, if needed.

When the French (AA) were first perceived by Byron, their line was forming; the long thin column lengthening out gradually to the north-north-west, from the confused cluster[58] still to be seen at the anchorage.  Hoping to profit by their disorder, he signalled “a general chase in that quarter,[59] as well as for Rear-Admiral Rowley to leave the convoy; and as not more than fourteen or fifteen of the enemy’s ships appeared to