On the same day the French fleet was sighted off the coast of Virginia by a cruiser, which reached Howe on the 7th; and two days later another brought word that the enemy had anchored on the 8th off the Delaware.  There d’Estaing again tarried for two days, which were diligently improved by the British Admiral, who at the same time sent off despatches to warn Byron, of whose coming he now had heard.  Despite all his energy, his preparations still were far from complete, when on the morning of the 11th a third vessel arrived, announcing that the French were approaching.  That evening they anchored outside, four miles south of Sandy Hook.  Howe, who during all these days was indefatigable, not only in planning but also in personal supervision of details, hastened at once to place his vessels according to the disposition which he had determined, and which he had carefully explained to his captains, thus insuring an intelligent cooeperation on their part.

The narrow arm of land called Sandy Hook projects in a northerly direction from the New Jersey coast, and covers the lower bay of New York on the south side.  The main ship-channel, then as now, ran nearly east and west, at right angles to the Hook and close to its northern end.  Beyond the channel, to the north, there was no solid ground for fortification within the cannon range of that day.  Therefore such guns as could be mounted on shore, five in number, were placed in battery at the end of the Hook.  These formed the right flank of the defence, which was continued thence to the westward by a line of seven ships, skirting the southern edge of the channel.  As the approach of the French, if they attacked, must be with an easterly wind and a rising tide, the ships were placed with that expectation; and in such wise that, riding with their heads to the eastward, each successive one, from van to rear, lay a little outside—­north—­of her next ahead.  The object of this indented formation was that each ship might bring her broadside to bear east, and yet fire clear of those to the east of her.  In order to effect this concentration of all the batteries in an easterly direction, which would rake the approach of the enemy, a spring[23] was run from the outer, or port quarter of every ship, except the leader.[24] These springs were not taken to the bow cable or anchor, as was often done, but to anchors of their own, placed broad off the port bows.  If, then, the enemy attacked, the ships, by simply keeping fast the springs and veering the cables, would swing with their broadsides facing east.  If the enemy, which had no bow fire, survived his punishment, and succeeded in advancing till abreast the British line, it was necessary only to keep fast the cables and let go the springs; the ships would swing head to the east wind, and the broadsides would once more bear north, across the channel instead of along it.  These careful arrangements were subject, of course, to the mischance of shot cutting away cables or springs; but this was more than offset by the probable injury to the enemy’s spars and rigging, as well as hulls, before he could use his batteries at all.