Arnold’s last reinforcements reached him at Valcour on the 6th of October.  On that day, and in the action of the 11th, he had with him all the American vessels on the Lake, except one schooner and one galley.  His force, thus, was two schooners and a sloop, broadside vessels, besides four galleys and eight gondolas, which may be assumed reasonably to have depended on their bow guns; there, at least, was their heaviest fire.  Thus reckoned, his flotilla, disposed to the best advantage, could bring into action at one time, two 18’s, thirteen 12’s, one 9, two 6’s, twelve 4’s, and two 2-pounders, independent of swivels; total thirty-two guns, out of eighty-four that were mounted in fifteen vessels.  To this the British had to oppose, in three broadside vessels, nine 12’s and thirteen 6’s, and in twenty gunboats, twenty other brass guns, “from twenty-four to nines, some with howitzers;"[7] total forty-two guns.  In this statement the radeau and gondola have not been included, because of their unmanageableness.  Included as broadside vessels, they would raise the British armament—­by three 24’s, three 12’s, four 9’s, and a howitzer—­to a total of fifty-three guns.  Actually, they could be brought into action only under exceptional circumstances, and are more properly omitted.

These minutiae are necessary for the proper appreciation of what Captain Douglas justly called “a momentous event.”  It was a strife of pigmies for the prize of a continent, and the leaders are entitled to full credit both for their antecedent energy and for their dispositions in the contest; not least the unhappy man who, having done so much to save his country, afterwards blasted his name by a treason unsurpassed in modern war.  Energy and audacity had so far preserved the Lake to the Americans; Arnold determined to have one more try of the chances.  He did not know the full force of the enemy, but he expected that “it would be very formidable, if not equal to ours."[8] The season, however, was so near its end that a severe check would equal a defeat, and would postpone Carleton’s further advance to the next spring.  Besides, what was the worth of such a force as the American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticonderoga, the Lake being lost?  It was eminently a case for taking chances, even if the detachment should be sacrificed, as it was.

Arnold’s original purpose had been to fight under way; and it was from this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of their mobility.  It is uncertain when he first learned of the rig and battery of the Inflexible; but a good look-out was kept, and the British squadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the narrows.  It may have been seen even earlier; for Carleton had been informed, erroneously, that the Americans were near Grand Island, which led him to incline to that side, and so open out Valcour sooner.  The British anchored for the night of October 10th, between Grand and Long[9] Islands.  Getting under way next morning, they