Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon Lake Champlain.  The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept the superiority obtained for them by Arnold’s promptitude a year before.  On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding the Northern Department, wrote:  “We have happily such a naval superiority on Lake Champlain, that I have a confident hope the enemy will not appear upon it this campaign, especially as our force is increasing by the addition of gondolas, two nearly finished.  Arnold, however,”—­whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted with the naval preparations,—­“says that 300 carpenters should be employed and a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc., be built, twenty or thirty at least.  There is great difficulty in getting the carpenters needed.”  Arnold’s ideas were indeed on a scale worthy of the momentous issues at stake.  “To augment our navy on the lake appears to me of the utmost importance.  There is water between Crown Point and Pointe au Fer for vessels of the largest size.  I am of opinion that row-galleys are the best construction and cheapest for this lake.  Perhaps it may be well to have one frigate of 36 guns.  She may carry 18-pounders on the Lake, and be superior to any vessel that can be built or floated from St. John’s.”

Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and means were far inferior to those of their opponents, who were able eventually to carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold’s idea of a sailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in inland waters.  Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of somewhat similar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was afloat, reversing all the conditions.  To place and equip her, however, required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold’s two schooners exercised control.  Baron Riedesel, the commander of the German contingent with Carleton, after examining the American position at Ticonderoga, wrote, “If we could have begun our expedition four weeks earlier, I am satisfied that everything would have been ended this year (1776); but, not having shelter nor other necessary things, we were unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Champlain.”  So delay favors the defence, and changes issues.  What would have been the effect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the loss of New York, August 20th-September 15th, had come news of the fall of Ticonderoga, the repute of which for strength stood high?  Nor was this all; for in that event, the plan which was wrecked in 1777 by Sir William Howe’s ill-conceived expedition to the Chesapeake would doubtless have been carried out in 1776.  In a contemporary English paper occurs the following significant item:  “London, September 26th, 1776.  Advices have been received here from Canada, dated August 12th, that General Burgoyne’s army has found it impracticable to get across the lakes this season.  The naval force