The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.

The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.

At length, at 2 P.M., being then twenty-five miles south-east of the port, the French drew near enough to bear down.  That this movement might be carried out with precision, and all the vessels come into action together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the wind, on the starboard tack, to rectify the order.  This also being done poorly and slowly, he lost patience,—­as Nelson afterwards said, “A day is soon lost in manoeuvring,”—­and at 2.30, to spur on the laggard ships, the French admiral gave the signal to attack, (a), specifying pistol-range.  Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquents promptly into line with the flagship, the latter fired a gun to enforce obedience.  Her own side being still turned towards the British, as she waited, the report was taken by the flagship’s men below decks to be the signal for opening fire, and her whole broadside was discharged.  This example was followed by the other ships, so that the engagement, instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot.

[Illustration]

Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his fleet now in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up.  The French, starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolution, under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B).  Seven ships, prematurely rounding-to to bring their broadsides to the enemy, and fore-reaching, formed a confused group (v), much to windward and somewhat ahead of the British van.  Imperfectly deployed, they interfered with one another and their fire consequently could not be adequately developed.  In the rear a somewhat similar condition existed.  Suffren, expecting the bulk of his line to fight the British to windward, had directed the Vengeur, 64, and the Consolante, 36, to double to leeward on the extreme rear; but they, finding that the weather sides of the enemy were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should be cut off.  They attacked the rear British ship, the Worcester, 64 (w), to windward; but the Monmouth, 64 (m), dropping down to her support, and the Vengeur catching fire in the mizzen top, they were compelled to haul off.  Only Suffren’s own ship, the Heros, 74 (a), and her next astern, the Illustre, 74, (i), came at once to close action with the British centre; but subsequently the Ajax, 64, succeeding in clearing herself from the snarl in the rear, took station ahead (j) of the Heros.  Upon these three fell the brunt of the fight.  They not only received the broadsides of the ships immediately opposed to them, but, the wind having now become light yet free, the British vessels ahead and astern, (h, s,) by luffing or keeping off, played also upon them.  “The enemy formed a semicircle around us,” wrote Suffren’s chief of staff, “and raked us ahead and astern, as the ship came up and fell off with the helm to leeward.”  The two seventy-fours were crushed under this fire.  Both lost their main and mizzen masts in the course of the day, and the foretopmast of the flagship also fell.  The Ajax, arriving later, and probably drawing less attention, had only a topmast shot away.

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The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.