should attack the other side of the English rear.  This plan of intended battle is shown by the figure D in the diagram.  Actually, only two of the French rear did what Suffren expected, engaging to leeward of the extreme British rear; the others of the French rear remaining long out of action (C).  The figure C shows the imperfect achievement of the design D. However, as the position of Suffren’s flagship prevented the British van from tacking into action, the net result was, to use Hughes’s own words, that “the enemy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five of ours.”  It will be noted with interest that these were exactly the numbers engaged in the first act of the battle of the Nile.  The Exeter (like the Guerrier at the Nile) received the fresh broadsides of the first five of the enemy, and then remained in close action on both sides, assailed by two, and at last by three, opponents,—­two 50’s, and one 64.  When the third approached, the master of the ship asked Commodore Richard King, whose broad pennant flew at her masthead, “What is to be done?” “There is nothing to be done,” replied King, “but to fight her till she sinks.”  Her loss, 10 killed and 45 wounded, was not creditable under the circumstances to the French gunnery, which had been poor also at Porto Praya.  At 6 P.M. the wind shifted to south-east, throwing all on the other tack, and enabling the British van at last to come into action.  Darkness now approaching, Suffren hauled off and anchored at Pondicherry.  Hughes went on to Trincomalee to refit.  The British loss had been 32 killed, among whom were Captain William Stevens of the flagship, and Captain Henry Reynolds, of the Exeter, and 83 wounded.  The French had 30 killed; the number of their wounded is put by Professor Laughton at 100.

On the 12th of March Hughes returned to Madras, and towards the end of the month sailed again for Trincomalee carrying reinforcements and supplies.  On the 30th he was joined at sea by the Sultan, 74, and the Magnanime, 64, just from England.  Suffren had remained on the coast from reasons of policy, to encourage Hyder Ali in his leaning to the French; but, after landing a contingent of troops on the 22d of March, to assist at the siege of the British port of Cuddalore, he put to sea on the 23d, and went south, hoping to intercept the Sultan and Magnanime off the south end of Ceylon.  On the 9th of April he sighted the British fleet to the south and west of him.  Hughes, attaching the first importance to the strengthening of Trincomalee, had resolved neither to seek nor to shun action.  He therefore continued his course, light northerly airs prevailing, until the 11th, when, being about fifty miles to the north-east of his port, he bore away for it.  Next morning, April 12th, finding that the enemy could overtake his rear ships, he formed line on the starboard tack, at two cables’ intervals, heading to the westward, towards the coast of Ceylon, wind north