practice of aiming at the spars and sails, however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends.  As illustrative of this result, the British loss will be stated here.  It was but 243 killed and 816 wounded in a fleet of thirty-six sail.  The highest in any one ship was that of the Duke, 73 killed and wounded.  No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French loss has ever been given.  None is cited by French authorities.  Sir Gilbert Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned that of the Ville de Paris alone to be 300.  There being fifty-four hundred troops distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties would be proportionately more numerous; but, even allowing for this, there can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier’s words, “was certainly much more considerable” than that reported by the British.  Six post-captains out of thirty were killed, against two British out of thirty-six.

Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity, which accident rather than design had given him at noon of April 12th.  He did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing the order for the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted at 1 P.M., was hauled down a half-hour later.  Hood, who realised the conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences therefrom, wished the order given for a general chase, which would have applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without surrendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet movements.  He bitterly censured the Admiral’s failure to issue this command.  Had it been done, he said:—­

“I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the enemy’s ships before dark.  Instead of that, he pursued only under his topsails (sometimes his foresail was set and at others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the afternoon, though the flying enemy had all the sail set their very shattered state would allow."[123]

To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of a junior admiral; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals to individual ships of his own division to make more sail, by setting all he could on the Barfleur, and by getting out his boats to tow her head round.  Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similar impression of laxity.

“After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of the day was partial and desultory, the enemy never being able to form, and several of the [our] ships being obliged to lie by and repair their damages.  As the signal for the line was now hauled down, every ship annoyed the enemy as their respective commanders judged best."[124]

For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices, the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated,