De Grasse now had recognised that he could not escape action, if the convoy kept company.  He therefore directed the two 50-gun ships, Experiment and Sagittaire, to accompany it into Guadeloupe, where it arrived safely that day (Position 1, dd); and he decided that the fleet should ply to windward through the channel between Dominica and Guadeloupe, nearly midway in which lies a group of small islands called Les Saintes,—­a name at times given to the battle of April 12th.  By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away from the convoy, but also to throw off pursuit through his superior speed, and so to accomplish his mission unharmed.  The French ships, larger, deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were naturally better sailers, and it may be inferred that even coppering had not entirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British.

At the very moment of beginning his new policy, however, a subtle temptation assailed de Grasse irresistibly, in the exposed position of Hood’s column (h); and he met it, not by a frank and hearty acceptance of a great opportunity, but by a half-measure.  Hood thoroughly crushed, the British fleet became hopelessly inferior to the French; Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior:  possibly it would be deterred from further pursuit.  De Grasse decided for this second course, and ordered part of his fleet to attack.  This operation was carried out under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command.  The ships engaged in it bore down from the windward, attacked Hood’s rear ships, stood along northward (f) on the weather side of his column at long range, and, having passed ahead, tacked (t) in succession and formed again in the rear, (f^2) whence they repeated the same manoeuvre (Positions 1 and 2).  Thus a procession of fifteen ships kept passing by eight, describing a continuous curve of elliptical form.  They were able to do this because Hood was condemned to a low speed, lest he should draw too far away from the British centre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica (Position 2).  The French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunshot, because they were deficient in carronades, of which the British had many.  These guns, of short range but large calibre, were thus rendered useless.  Could they have come into play, the French rigging and sails would have suffered severely.  This first engagement (Position 1) lasted, by Hood’s log, from 9.48 to 10.25 A.M.  It was resumed in stronger force (Position 2) at 14 minutes past noon, and continued till 1.45 P.M., when firing ceased for that day; Rodney hauling down the signal for battle at 2.  Between the two affairs, which were identical in general character, Hood’s column was reinforced, and great part of the British centre also got into action with some of the French main body, though at long range only.  “Except the two rear ships,” wrote Rodney to Hood that night, “the others fired at such a distance that I returned none.”