“The second ship astern of her (of the London) received but trifling damage, and the third astern of her received no damage at all, which most clearly proves [at] how much too great a distance was the centre division engaged.”

The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criticisms upon it, which has been published.  The gist of this is as follows.  As the French stood out, their line was not regular or connected.  The van was much separated from the centre and rear, and it appears also, from the French narratives, that it was to windward of the rest of the fleet.  From these causes it was much exposed to be attacked unsupported.  There was, by Hood’s estimate, “a full hour and a half to have engaged it before any of the rear could have come up.”  The line of battle on the port tack, with the then wind, was east and west, and Graves had first ranged his fleet on it, as the French were doing; but afterwards, owing to his method of approach, by the van bearing down and the other ships following in its wake, the two lines, instead of being parallel, formed an angle, the British centre and rear being much more distant from the enemy than the van was.  This alone would cause the ships to come into battle successively instead of together, a fault of itself; but the Commander-in-Chief, according to Hood, committed the further mistake that he kept the signal for the line of battle flying until 5.30 P.M., near to sunset.  In Hood’s understanding, while that signal flew the position of each ship was determined by that of Graves’s flagship.  None could go closer than the line through her parallel to the enemy.  Hence Hood’s criticism, which is marked by much acerbity towards his superior, but does not betray any consciousness that he himself needed any justification for his division not having taken part.

“Had the centre gone to the support of the van, and the signal for the line been hauled down, or the Commander-in-Chief had set the example of close action, even with the signal for the line flying, the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed to those ships the centre division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging, or the Rear-Admiral who commanded it[100] would have a great deal to answer for."[101]

So much for the tactical failure of that day.  The question remained what next was to be done.  Graves contemplated renewing the action, but early in the night was informed that several of the van ships were too crippled to permit this.  He held his ground, however, in sight of the French, until dark on the 9th, when they were seen for the last time.  They were then under a cloud of sail, and on the morning of the 10th had disappeared.  From their actions during this interval, Hood had inferred that de Grasse meant to get back into the Chesapeake without further fighting; and he implies that he advised Graves to