The preparations of the French in Brest were completed towards the end of March, and on the 22d of that month Rear-Admiral de Grasse sailed, having a large convoy under the protection of twenty-six ships of the line.  A week later six of the latter parted company, five under Suffren for the East Indies and one for North America.  The remaining twenty continued their course for Martinique, which was sighted on the 28th of April.  Before sunset, Hood’s squadron also was discovered to leeward of the island, as ordered by Rodney to cruise, and off the southern point,—­Pointe des Salines.  De Grasse then hove-to for the night, but sent an officer ashore both to give and to obtain intelligence, and to reach an understanding for concerted action next day.

The French fleet consisted of one ship of 110 guns, three 80’s, fifteen 74’s, and one 64, in all 20 of the line, besides three armed en flute,[91] which need not be taken into account, although they served to cover the convoy.  Besides these there were the four in Fort Royal, one 74 and three 64’s, a junction of which with the approaching enemy it was one of Hood’s objects to prevent.  The force of the British was one 90, one 80, twelve 74’s, one 70, and two 64’s:  total, 17.  Thus both in numbers and in rates of ships Hood was inferior to the main body alone of the French; but he had the advantage of ships all coppered, owing to Rodney’s insistence with the Admiralty.  He also had no convoy to worry him; but he was to leeward.

Early in the morning of the 29th, de Grasse advanced to round the southern point of the island, which was the usual course for sailing ships.  Hood was too far to leeward to intercept this movement, for which he was blamed by Rodney, who claimed that the night had not been properly utilised by beating to windward of Pointe des Salines.[92] Hood, on the other hand, said in a private letter:  “I never once lost sight of getting to windward, but it was totally impossible....  Had I fortunately been there, I must have brought the enemy to close action upon more equal terms, or they must have given up their transports, trade, etc.”  Hood’s subsequent career places it beyond doubt that had he been to windward there would have been a severe action, whatever the result; but it is not possible to decide positively between his statement and Rodney’s, as to where the fault of being to leeward lay.  The writer believes that Hood would have been to windward, if in any way possible.  It must be added that the British had no word that so great a force was coming.  On this point Hood and Rodney are agreed.

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