The essence of the case was stated by our government in its note of June 9 as follows: 

“Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare.”

Three notes were written to Germany regarding the Lusitania sinking.  The first dated May 13 advanced the idea that it was impossible to conduct submarine warfare conformably with international law.  In the second dated June 9 occurs the statement that “the government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce.  It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity.”  In the third note dated July 21, it is asserted that “the events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct submarine operations within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare.”  The temper of the American people and the president’s notes had succeeded in securing a modification of the submarine campaign.

It required cool statesmanship to prevent a rushing into war over the Lusitania incident and events which had preceeded it.  There was a well developed movement in favor of it, but the people were not unanimous on the point.  It would have lacked that cooperation necessary for effectiveness; besides our country was but poorly prepared for engaging in hostilities.  It was our state of unpreparedness continuing for a long time afterwards, which contributed, no doubt, to German arrogance.  They thought we would not fight.

But the United States had become thoroughly awakened and the authorities must have felt that if the conflict was to be unduly prolonged, we must eventually be drawn into it.  This is reflected in the modified construction which the president and others began to place on the Monroe Doctrine.  The great underlying idea of the doctrine remained vital, but in a message to congress delivered December 7, 1915, the president said: 

“In the day in whose light we now stand there is no claim of guardianship, but a full and honorable association as of partners between ourselves and our neighbors in the interests of America.”  Speaking before the League to Enforce Peace at Washington, May 27, 1916, he said:  “What affects mankind is inevitably our affair, as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.”  In his address to the senate of January 22, 1917, he said:  “I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world—­that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.”  This was a modifying and enlarging of the doctrine, as well as a departure from Washington’s warning against becoming entangled with the affairs of Europe.