In the light of the fine record made by such Negro officers as were given responsible commands, let us hope for the future honor of the nation; preening herself as being in the vanguard of the progressive commonwealths of the age, that a policy so unjust, narrow and unworthy will; as quickly as feasible be abandoned.  In favor of Negro commanders is the additional testimony of high French generals, who knew no color distinction and could see no reason why a Negro should not command his own race troops if he had intelligence, courage and military skill.  Indeed there are not wanting in the annals of French warfare brilliant examples where men of African blood commanded not only mulattoes and blacks, but heroic whites as well.  It is not of record that those white Frenchmen showed any reluctance to follow such leaders or viewed them with less affection than they did their white officers.

One should not say that the Negro troops would have fought any better under the men of their own race.  They achieved all possible glory as it was.  They simply did their duty whether their officers were white or black.  But that they did not fight any the less valiantly or efficiently under men of their own race is abundantly proven by the record of the 370th, or the 8th Illinois as the soldiers and their people still prefer to call it; and other units which had Negroes in responsible positions.

That there was disappointment, chagrin and anger in the rank and file of the Negro soldiers when their own officers were taken from them and white men substituted was natural and quite to be expected.

However, there was little open murmuring.  While the Negro regarded the removal of the officers who had trained him and were, in a sense, his comrades, unfair and uncalled for, his fighting spirit, seemed to burn with an intenser heat; a determination to do his best to show and shame the spirit that robbed him of his own race leaders, and at the same time convince his white commanders of the stuff he was made of.

There was much disappointment in the ranks of the District of Columbia battalion, when the place of its old leader was taken by Major Clark L. Dickson, twenty-seven years of age, one of the youngest—­if not the youngest—­of battalion commanders in the American army.  But their disappointment was soon allayed, for Major Dickson made an enviable record.  He received the Croix de Guerre with this citation: 

“Most efficient officer, valorous and intrepid, acting in dual capacity as regimental adjutant and operation officer.  Displayed the utmost energy in issuing operation orders during the period between September 26th and October 6th, 1918, and especially distinguished himself in crossing a roadway under violent artillery fire to give assistance to a wounded brother officer.  His clear view of the situation at all times and the accuracy with which he issued the necessary orders required of him, contributed largely to the success of the regiment.”

Many of his men have stated that the citation only hinted at the real accomplishments of Major Dickson.