Patiala was true to his word, and throughout the Mutiny the Phulkian Chiefs remained perfectly loyal, and performed the important service of keeping open communication between Delhi and the Punjab.[10]

On the 19th May General Anson was cheered by hearing from John Lawrence that the Corps of Guides and four trusty Punjab regiments were proceeding by forced marches to join him.  On the 21st he received a message from the Governor-General informing him that European troops were coming from Madras, Bombay, and Ceylon.  He also heard of the arrival of the siege-train at Umballa, and he had the satisfaction of telegraphing to the Chief Commissioner that the first detachment of the column destined for Delhi had started.

On the 23rd the Commander-in-Chief communicated his plan of operations to General Hewitt.  It was as follows:  Two brigades were to advance from Umballa, commanded by Brigadier Hallifax of the 75th Foot, and Colonel Jones of the 60th Rifles; and one brigade from Meerut, under the command of Brigadier Archdale Wilson.  The two former were to be concentrated at Kurnal by the 30th May, and were then to advance, under General Anson, so as to arrive opposite Baghput on the 5th June, at which place they were to be joined by the Meerut brigade, and the united force was then to proceed to Delhi.

All his arrangements being now completed, Anson left Umballa on the 24th May, and reached Kurnal the following morning.  On the 26th he was struck down by cholera, and in a few hours succumbed to that fatal disease.  His last words expressed a hope that his country would do him justice, and it is grievous to feel that, in estimating his work and the difficulties he had to encounter, full justice has not been done him.  Anson has been undeservedly blamed for vacillation and want of promptitude.  He was told to ‘make short work of Delhi,’ but before Delhi could be taken more men had perished than his whole force at that time amounted to.  The advice to march upon Delhi was sound, but had it been rashly followed disaster would have been the inevitable result.  Had the Commander-in-Chief been goaded into advancing without spare ammunition and siege Artillery, or with an insufficient force, he must have been annihilated by the overwhelming masses of the mutineers—­those mutineers, who, we shall see later, stoutly opposed Barnard’s greatly augmented force at Badli-ki-Serai, would almost certainly have repulsed, if not destroyed, a smaller body of troops.

On the death of General Anson the command of the Field Force devolved on Major-General Sir Henry Barnard.