Forty-one years in India eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,042 pages of information about Forty-one years in India.

Forty-one years in India eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,042 pages of information about Forty-one years in India.

The change in policy which induced the Government of India to assist a struggling Amir with money, after its repeated and emphatic declarations that interference was impossible, was undoubtedly brought about by an able and elaborate memorandum written by the late Sir Henry Rawlinson on the 28th July, 1868.  In this paper Rawlinson pointed out that, notwithstanding promises to the contrary, Russia was steadily advancing towards Afghanistan.  He referred to the increased facilities of communication which would be the result of the recent proposal to bring Turkestan into direct communication, via the Caspian, with the Caucasus and St. Petersburg.  He dwelt at length upon the effect which the advanced position of Russia in Central Asia would have upon Afghanistan and India.  He explained that by the occupation of Bokhara Russia would gain a pretext for interfering in Afghan politics, and ’that if Russia once assumes a position which, in virtue either of an imposing military force on the Oxus, or of a dominant political influence in Afghanistan, entitles her, in Native estimation, to challenge our Asiatic supremacy, the disquieting effect will be prodigious.’

‘With this prospect before us,’ Sir Henry asked, ’are we justified in maintaining what has been sarcastically, though perhaps unfairly, called Sir John Lawrence’s policy of “masterly inaction”?  Are we justified in allowing Russia to work her way to Kabul unopposed, and there to establish herself as a friendly power prepared to protect the Afghans against the English?’ He argued that it was contrary to our interests to permit anarchy to reign in Afghanistan; that Lord Auckland’s famous doctrine of ’establishing a strong and friendly Power on our North-West Frontier’ was the right policy for India, ’that Dost Mahomed’s successful management of his country was in a great measure due to our aid, and that, if we had helped the son as we had helped the father, Sher Ali would have summarily suppressed the opposition of his brothers and nephews.’  Rawlinson then added:  ’Another opportunity now presents itself.  The fortunes of Sher Ali are again in the ascendant; he should be secured in our interests without delay.’

Rawlinson’s suggestions were not at the time supposed to commend themselves to the Government of India.  In the despatch in which they were answered,[5] the Viceroy and his Councillors stated that they still objected to any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan; they foresaw no limits to the expenditure which such a move would entail, and they believed that the objects that they had at heart might be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on the frontier.  It is worthy of note, however, that, after Sir Henry Rawlinson’s memorandum had been received by the Indian Government, and notwithstanding these protests, the sum of L60,000 was sent to Sher Ali, that Sir John Lawrence invited him ’to come to some place in British territory for a personal meeting in order

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