made further efforts through Mr. Justice Campbell of the Supreme Court, as a friendly intermediary, who came to Seward in the guise of a loyal official, though his correspondence with Jefferson Davis soon revealed a treasonable intent; and, replying to Campbell’s earnest entreaties that peace should be maintained, Seward informed him confidentially that the military status at Charleston would not be changed without notice to the governor of South Carolina.  On March 29 a cabinet meeting for the second time discussed the question of Sumter.  Four of the seven members now voted in favor of an attempt to supply the fort with provisions, and the President signed a memorandum order to prepare certain ships for such an expedition, under the command of Captain G.V.  Fox.

So far, Mr. Lincoln’s new duties as President of the United States had not in any wise put him at a disadvantage with his constitutional advisers.  Upon the old question of slavery he was as well informed and had clearer convictions and purposes than either Seward or Chase.  And upon the newer question of secession, and the immediate decision about Fort Sumter which it involved, the members of his cabinet were, like himself, compelled to rely on the professional advice of experienced army and navy officers.  Since these differed radically in their opinions, the President’s own powers of perception and logic were as capable of forming a correct decision as men who had been governors and senators.  He had reached at least a partial decision in the memorandum he gave Fox to prepare ships for the Sumter expedition.

It must therefore have been a great surprise to the President when, on April 1, Secretary of State Seward handed him a memorandum setting forth a number of most extraordinary propositions.  For a full enumeration of the items the reader must carefully study the entire document, which is printed below in a foot-note;[4] but the principal points for which it had evidently been written and presented can be given in a few sentences.

 [Footnote 4:  SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT’S CONSIDERATION.  APRIL
 1, 1861.

 First.  We are at the end of a month’s administration, and yet
 without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

Second.  This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable.  The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

 Third.  But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for
 both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on
 the administration, but danger upon the country.

 Fourth.  To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office.  But
 how?  I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith,
 leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

 Fifth.  The policy at home.  I am aware that my views are singular
 and perhaps not sufficiently explained My system is built upon this
 idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must