which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany.  Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it?  If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning.  We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia.  This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words: 

     I entirely approve what you said ... and I cannot promise more on
     behalf of the Government.—­(British “White Paper” No. 24.)

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally join Russia and France: 

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms.  Their [the German] attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.—­(British “White Paper” No. 44.)

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27): 

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside.  His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.  This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manoeuvre leave.  But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.—­(British “White Paper” No. 47.)

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action.  Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it.  Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object.  You find among the documents of the Russian “Orange Book” the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London: