New York Times Current History: The European War from the Beginning to March 1915, Vol 1, No. 2 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 480 pages of information about New York Times Current History.

New York Times Current History: The European War from the Beginning to March 1915, Vol 1, No. 2 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 480 pages of information about New York Times Current History.
... but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna.  He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible.—­(British “White Paper” No. 71.)

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen’s of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated: 

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany’s position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.—­(British “White Paper” No. 98.)

The British Government has added a few further publications to its “White Paper.”  Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen.  The document is dated Sept. 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war.  The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg.  In this report it is stated: 

(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising.  Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the pour parleurs....  On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Servia....  Unfortunately these pour parleurs in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia.  Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris....  A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result

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New York Times Current History: The European War from the Beginning to March 1915, Vol 1, No. 2 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.