The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following reason also.—­They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and likewise that the pradhana, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration.  Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or does not define it.  Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under discussion.  For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.  The numerical measure of pradhana, souls, and Lord is defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient).  The number of the souls is a high one[418].  From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa/m/sara, that means their sa/m/sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the samsara comes to an end.  Gradually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire sa/m/sara and the sa/m/sara state of all souls.  But the pradhana which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by sa/m/sara.  Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer any objects.  But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general void.—­Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.—­But that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears unacceptable.

42.  On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative cause of the world.  We are now going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material as well as the operative cause.—­But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm/ri/ti, in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?—­It is true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the Vedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.