the beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men.  It is, moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyayikas themselves that ‘imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action’ (Nyaya Sutra I, 1, 18).  Experience shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection.  And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with pity).—­Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

38.  And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhana).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way.  But of what nature is that connexion to be?  It cannot be conjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhana and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts.  Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing.  Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not settled as yet[417].—­How, then, it may be asked, do you—­the Vedantins—­establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the world)?—­There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume is that of identity (tadatmya).  The adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets throughout conformable to observation.  Our adversary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience.  Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedantin; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.—­For all these reasons the Sa@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation.  Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.