cognition ’this is similar to that’ is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms—­viz. ‘this’ and ’that’—­being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity).  If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression ’this is similar to that’ would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of ‘similarity’ only.—­Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves.  Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts.  Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that.  We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds.  But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.—­For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.

26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.

The system of the Vaina/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from non-entity.  This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, ’On account of the manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).’  For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar.  If effects did spring from the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once, as then no specification would be required[403].  Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from non-entity.