general non-permanency.—­Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases[394].—­Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing’s own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing.  But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles.  If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word ‘thing’ and the words ‘origination’ and ‘cessation’ are interchangeable (which is not the case).—­Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms ‘origination’ and ‘cessation’ may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing.—­In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned.—­Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse.—­That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting.  And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.—­Hence we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

21.  On the supposition of there being no (cause:  while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.—­Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause.—­That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395].  Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time.—­If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396] are momentary merely.

22.  Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.