19.  And like a piece of cloth.

As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i.e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.—­Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude that the latter is non-different from the former.

20.  And as in the case of the different vital airs.

It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air—­such as pra/n/a the ascending vital air, apana the descending vital air, &c.—­are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped.  When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.—­Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common character.  Thus (i.e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.—­As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that ’What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known’ (Ch.  Up.  VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled[301].

21.  On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.—­If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i.e.  Brahman), ‘on account of the other being designated.’  For Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, ’That is the Self; that art thou, O Svetaketu!’ (Ch.  Up.  VI, 8, 7.)—­Or else (if we interpret ‘the other’ of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e.  Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul.