This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase ‘as clay they are true’ asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase ‘having its origin in speech’ declares the unreality of all effects.  And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, ’In that all this has its Self;’ and, again, ‘That is true;’ whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is true.  The following passage again, ‘That is the Self; thou art that, O Svetaketu!’ teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour.  This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken).  And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world—­which is based on the individual soul—­having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside.  But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in addition to the element of unity.—­Scriptural passages also (such as, ’When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?’ B/ri/.  Up.  II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent.  Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage ‘Thou art that’ shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.  Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Ch.  VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge.  For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false-minded[281]?  Another scriptural passage (’from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,’ B/ri/.  Up.  IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.—­Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world.  For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true?