the passage under discussion, attributed to that which
is higher than the source of all beings—which
latter is denoted by the term ’the Imperishable’—not
to the source itself, we reply that this explanation
is inadmissible because the source of all beings,
which—in the clause, ’From the Indestructible
everything here arises’—is designated
as the material cause of all created beings, is later
on spoken of as all-knowing, and again as the cause
of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I,
1, 9), ’From him who knows all and perceives
all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him
is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.’
As therefore the Indestructible which forms the general
topic of discussion is, owing to the identity of designation,
recognised (as being referred to in the later passage
also), we understand that it is the same Indestructible
to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all
are ascribed.—We further maintain that
also the passage, ’Higher than the high Imperishable,’
does not refer to any being different from the imperishable
source of all beings which is the general topic of
discussion. We conclude this from the circumstance
that the passage, ’He truly told that knowledge
of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable
true person,’ (I, 2, 13; which passage leads
on to the passage about that which is higher than
the Imperishable,) merely declares that the imperishable
source of all beings, distinguished by invisibility
and the like—which formed the subject of
the preceding chapter—will be discussed.
The reason why that imperishable source is called
higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain
under the next Sutra.—Moreover, two kinds
of knowledge are enjoined there (in the Upanishad),
a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it
is said that it comprises the Rig-veda and
so on, and then the text continues, ’The higher
knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.’
Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject
of the higher knowledge. If we now were to assume
that the Indestructible distinguished by invisibility
and like qualities is something different from the
highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not
be the higher one. For the distinction of lower
and higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity
of their results, the former leading to mere worldly
exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody
would assume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge
of the pradhana.—Moreover, as on the view
we are controverting the highest Self would be assumed
to be something higher than the imperishable source
of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have
to be acknowledged, while the text expressly speaks
of two kinds only.—Further, the reference
to the knowledge of everything being implied in the
knowledge of one thing—which is contained
in the passage (I, 1, 3), ’Sir, what is that
through which if it is known everything else becomes


