is the Self, that art thou, O Svetaketu,’ teaches the Self in its true nature also.  Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Ch.  Up.  VI, 16).  For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ‘that art thou’ would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only[97], like the knowledge derived from the passage, ‘I am the hymn’ (Ait.  Ar.  II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release.  Therefore the word ‘Self’ is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense.  In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word ‘Self’ can—­in such phrases as ’Bhadrasena is my Self’—­be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by perception.  Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e.  Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence.  The assertion that the word ‘Self’ may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word ‘jyotis’ signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings.  Hence (we rather assume that) the word ‘Self’ in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such phrases as ‘the Self of the elements,’ ‘the Self of the senses.’  And even if we assume that the word ‘Self’ primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word.  But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity.  That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with Svetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown.  All these circumstances determine the object of the word ‘Self’ here to be something intelligent.  The word ‘jyotis’ does moreover not furnish an appropriate example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of ‘light’ only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.