of a jar,’ &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on.  That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception.  And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pradhana not basing on Scripture.  That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the second Adhyaya (II, 1, 4, &c.).

Here the Sa@nkhya comes forward with a new objection.  The difficulty stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings.  We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, ‘the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),’ and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence.  So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking.  Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.—­But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word ‘thought’ and for taking it in a figurative sense?—­The observation, the Sa@nkhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, ’That fire thought; that water thought’ (Ch.  Up.  VI, 2, 3; 4).  We therefrom conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94].