The argumentation of the Sa@nkhyas that the pradhana may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible.  For as in the pradhana-condition the three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible[91].  Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge.  For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness.

Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle.  It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhana all-knowingness.  The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].—­Well then (say those Sa@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire.—­No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows.  In what way, we ask the Sa@nkhya, is Brahman’s all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity?  To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory.  If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing.  This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman’s knowledge to be permanent.—­But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.—­Why not? we reply; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent when we say, ’he burns, he gives light[93].’—­But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge.  The cases are therefore