beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything.  Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self.  And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided.  All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul.  But the soul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free.  And from passages, such as ’Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the goal, the highest road’ (Ka.  Up.  I, 3, 11), and ’That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee’ (B/ri/.  Up.  III, 9, 26), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic.  To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.

With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the Sastra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of injunctions and prohibitions.  With regard to the other passage quoted (’as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purportless’) we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless[81].  If, on the other hand, the Veda—­in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity—­does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self?  For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).—­But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action.—­This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions.  Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves.—­Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]?  We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other