departments of knowledge and not to throw together different sciences like the descriptive phenomenalistic account of inner life and its interpretative voluntaristic account merely because each sometimes calls itself psychology.  A classification of sciences which is to be more than a catalogue fulfills its logical function only by a careful disentanglement of logically different functions which are externally connected.  Psychology and the totality of psychological, philosophical and historical sciences offer in that respect far more difficulty than the physical sciences, which have absorbed up to this time the chief interest of the classifier.  It is time to follow up the ramifications of knowledge with special interest for these neglected problems.  It is clear that in such a system sciences which refer to the same objects may be widely separated, and sciences whose objects are unlike may be grouped together.  This is not an objection; it indicates that a system is more than a mere pigeon-holing of scholarly work, that it determines the logical relations; in this way only can it indeed become helpful to the progress of science itself.

The most direct way to our end is clearly that of graphic representation wherein the relations are at once apparent.  Of course such a map is a symbol and not an argument; it indicates the results of thought without any effort to justify them.  I have given my arguments for the fundamental principles of the divisions in my ‘Grundzuege der Psychologie’ and have repeated a few points more popularly in ‘Psychology and Life,’ especially in the chapter on ‘Psychology and History.’  And yet this graphic appendix to the Grundzuege may not be superfluous, as the fulness of a bulky volume cannot bring out clearly enough the fundamental relations; the detail hides the principles.  The parallelism of logical movements in the different fields especially becomes more obvious in the graphic form.  Above all, the book discussed merely those groups which had direct relation to psychology; a systematic classification must leave no remainder.  Of course here too I have not covered the whole field of human sciences, as the more detailed ramification offers for our purpose no logical interest; to subdivide physics or chemistry, the history of nations or of languages, practical jurisprudence or theology, engineering or surgery, would be a useless overburdening of the diagram without throwing new light on the internal relations of knowledge.

Without now entering more fully into any arguments, I may indicate in a few words the characteristic features of the graphically presented proposition.  At the very outset we must make it clear that phenomena and voluntaristic attitudes are not cooerdinated, but that the reality of phenomena is logically dependent upon voluntaristic attitudes directed towards the ideal of knowledge.  And yet it would be misleading to place the totality of phenomenalistic sciences as a subdivision under the teleological sciences.