of Sentiment, and Expression, he seems to have perfectly succeeded; there being perhaps no Variety, in all the Extent of these Subjects, which he has not presented to View in this Description.—­But he does not pretend to give any Definition of WIT, intimating rather that it is quite impossible to be given:  And indeed from his Description of it, as a Proteus, appearing in numberless various Colours, and Forms; and from his mistaking, and presenting for WIT, other different Mixtures and Substances, it is evident that his Idea of it was quite confused and uncertain:  It is true, he has discovered a vast Scope of Fertility of Genius, and an uncommon Power of collecting together a Multitude of Objects upon any Occasion, but he has here absolutely mistaken his work; for instead of exhibiting the Properties of WIT in a clearer Light, and confuting the false Claims which are made to it, he has made it his whole Business to perplex it the more, by introducing, from all Corners, a monstrous Troop of new unexpected Pretenders.

Dryden, in the Preface to his Opera, entitled, The State of
Innocence, or Fall of Man, gives the following Decree upon WIT. 
  The Definition of WIT, (which has been so often attempted, and
  ever unsuccessfully by many Poets) is only this:  That it is a
  Propriety of Thoughts and Words; or in other Terms, Thoughts and
  Words elegantly adapted to the Subject.

If Mr. Dryden imagined, that he had succeeded himself in this Definition, he was extremely mistaken; for nothing can be more distant from the Properties of WIT, than those he describes.  He discovers no Idea of the Surprize, and Brilliancy of WIT, or of the sudden Light thrown upon a Subject.  Instead of once pointing at these, he only describes the Properties of clear Reasoning, which are a Propriety of Thoughts and Words;—­Whereas WIT, in its sudden Flashes, makes no Pretension to Reasoning; but is perceived in the pleasant Surprize which it starts, and in the Light darted upon a Subject, which instantly vanishes again, without abiding a strict Examination.

The other Definition he gives, which is, Thoughts and Words elegantly adapted to the Subject, is very different from the former, but equally unhappy.

For Propriety, in Thoughts and Words, consists in exhibiting clear, pertinent Ideas, in precise and perspicuous Words.

Whereas ELEGANCE consists in the compt, well pruned and succinct Turn of a Subject.

The Object of the First, is to be clear, and perspicuous; whence it often appears in pursuit of these, not compt or succinct:  Whereas the Essence of ELEGANCE is to be compt and succinct, for the Sake of which Ornaments it often neglect Perspicuity, and Clearness.—­In short, a Propriety of Thoughts and Words, may subsist without any Elegance; as an Elegance of Thoughts and Words may appear without a perfect Propriety.