frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot.  The fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily be set on fire by incendiary projectiles.  The ship has many points exposed that may be called vital points.  By losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to use her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire:  these damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers; while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above—­namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be struck.

The opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fully accord with these deductions of theory.  Some few individuals mistaking, or misstating, the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress in the art of land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery.  Ignorant and superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in military science.  This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has received credit merely from its novelty.  Let us examine the several trials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts within the last fifty years, and see what have been the results.

In 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Cagliari, whose fortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely to deserve the name of defences.  Nevertheless, the French fleet, after a bombardment of three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to retire.

In 1794 two British ships, “the Fortitude of seventy-four, and the Juno frigate of thirty-two guns,” attacked a small town in the bay of Martello, Corsica, which was armed with one gun in barbette, and a garrison of thirty men.  After a bombardment of two and a half hours, these ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss of life.  The little tower had received no injury, and its garrison were unharmed.  Here were one hundred and six guns afloat against one on shore; and yet the latter was successful.

In 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of Santa Crux, in Teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns.  But notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he was repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the garrison received little or no damage.  A single ball from the land battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk her with near a hundred seamen and marines!