RHODE ISLAND.

Newport harbor,—­works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed.

CONNECTICUT.

New London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut river.  The first of these nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun.

NEW YORK.

The works projected for the defence of New York harbor are estimated to carry about one thousand guns.  These works are not yet one-half constructed.

PENNSYLVANIA.

The works projected for the defence of the Delaware Bay and Philadelphia will carry about one hundred and fifty guns.  They are not one-quarter built.

MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.

Baltimore and Annapolis—­these works will carry some two hundred and fifty guns.  The works for the Chesapeake Bay will carry about six hundred guns; and those for the Potomac river about eighty guns.  These are more than one-half completed.

NORTH CAROLINA.

The works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one hundred and fifty guns.  They are essentially completed.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

The works for the defence of Charleston carry some two hundred guns. 
They are one-half constructed.

GEORGIA.

The defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly three-quarters finished.

FLORIDA.

The works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, Key West, Tortugas, and Pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns.  Those at St. Augustine and Pensacola are essentially completed, but those at Key West and Tortugas are barely begun.

ALABAMA.

The works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one hundred and sixty guns.  These are nearly constructed.

LOUISIANA.

The works for the defence of New Orleans will carry some two hundred and fifty or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed.

The works north of the Chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per gun; those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun.  This difference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which the fortifications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in the south for materials and workmanship.

* * * * *

Having pointed out the character and condition of our system of sea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may be relied on as a means of security against a maritime descent.

To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine the three or four great maritime descents attempted by the English during the wars of the French Revolution; a period at which the great naval superiority of England over other nations, gave her the title of mistress of the seas.  Let us notice what have been the results of the several attempts made by this power at maritime invasions, and the means by which such attacks have been repelled.