There is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and militia forces.  The cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six months, in this country, has been estimated, from data in the War-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man; while the cost of a militia force, under the same circumstances, making allowance for the difference in the expenses from sickness, waste of camp-furniture, equipments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars per man.  But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like the expedition against Black Hawk and his Indians in the Northwest, and during the hostilities in Florida, “the expenses of the militia,” says Mr. Secretary Spencer, in a report to congress in 1842, “invariably exceed those of regulars by at least three hundred per cent.”  It is further stated that “fifty-five thousand militia were called into service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that thirty millions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts!” When it is remembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not exceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to perceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive.  Large sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered the slightest service.  Again, during our late war with Great Britain, of less than three years’ duration, two hundred and eighty thousand muskets were lost,—­the average cost of which is stated at twelve dollars,—­making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, of three millions and three hundred and sixty thousand dollars, during a service of about two years and a half;—­resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of public property which almost invariably attends the movements of newly-raised and inexperienced forces.  Facts like these should awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia.  General Knox, when Secretary of War, General Harrison while in the senate, and Mr. Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting this purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect.

Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of the two preceding elements of national defence.  They are passive in their nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and through these two contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign.  When once constructed they require but very little expenditure for their support.  In time of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life.  Of themselves they can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or dangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense.  While contributing to the economical support of a peace establishment, by furnishing drill-grounds, parades, quarters, &c.; and to its efficiency still